Enormous as the problems of the Habsburg empire had become by 1914, war, for that matter even a victorious war, was unlikely to solve any of them; on the contrary, it was bound to make their solution even more improbable than before. When before approving the war against Serbia Count István Tisza demanded assurances from Count Leopold von Berchtold that it would not lead to the incorporation of substantial numbers of Serbs into the Dual Monarchy, his demand should have raised doubts in sober minds about the practicability of war as a means of improving the stability and power of the Habsburg monarchy. Most of the Austrian policymakers believed that Austria-Hungary was forced to go to war in order to retain her reputation as a great power, but after Serbia had accepted practically all the demands of the Austrian ultimatum, Austria-Hungary could have been reasonably certain that it would emerge from the crisis sufficiently respected. A radical policy of prestige, such as that which the German government urged upon the Austrians during the July crisis, can, however, easily produce a neglect of reality.